

A Brand New Day or Back to the Future? The Dynamics of India-Pakistan Relations

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Five years ago India and Pakistan began a composite dialogue as part of the peace process with the goal of normalizing relations.¹ While the dialogue has achieved some notable milestones, other, more difficult, problems remain. On the positive side, the volume of trade as well as the frequency of cultural exchanges and people-to-people contact has never been so high. Further, in an effort to normalize relations over Kashmir, both governments are allowing people to legally travel across the disputed Line of Control (LOC), which demarcates administrations in Kashmir.

On the other hand, despite numerous meetings between bureaucrats and politicians as part of the composite dialogue, there has been very little progress on core areas of dispute—most notably, the territorial status of Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, and others. Moreover, preliminary evidence suggests the emergence of new theaters for India-Pakistan rivalry, notably Afghanistan. Further, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, military tensions and clashes appear to be just another terrorist attack away.

Important questions emerge from this process. First, have India-Pakistan relations broken through to an uncharted, and uncertain, territory since the dual “shocks” of the 1999 Kargil war and the 2001/2002 border mobilization crisis?² Or is this just another pause before tensions between the two neighbors erupt again? Second, have there been structural changes in the India-Pakistan relationship that have made the old paradigm of security competition irrelevant? Or has nuclear stability and diminished prospects for an all-out conventional war translated into the competition playing out elsewhere? Finally, how does India perceive its relations with Pakistan in the medium-term,

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and what factors shape its current and future policy? The answers to these questions could not only have an enormous impact on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, but will also, to a large extent, influence the future security architecture in Asia.

This article analyzes the dynamics of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship and concentrates primarily on the debate within India. While examining the sources of cooperation and competition, it identifies nine structural factors that shape the bilateral relationship. It argues that though India is following a “hedging” strategy towards Pakistan, its interests are better served by pursuing an engagement strategy. However this, in turn, is unlikely until the “infrastructures of terror” in Pakistan are permanently dismantled.³ Before concluding, the article suggests some policy recommendations for both countries that can help improve the bilateral relationship. The research methodology relies on interviews with policymakers conducted in India and the United States, combined with a review of journalistic and academic literature.

Understanding the dynamics of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship is important for four main reasons. First, events in South Asia play a crucial role in the current global struggle against Islamist fundamentalism. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), representing the view of 16 agencies in the US government, concurred that Al Qaeda has re-established a safe haven along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.⁴ Some of these terrorist networks operating within the region have also been implicated in attacks (or terror plots) outside the region.⁵ The countries of the region are suffering from large-scale terrorist violence with both domestic and regional roots.⁶ Hence, identifying, containing, and eliminating terrorist groups in the region assume both a regional and global significance. Unfortunately, competing national interests hamper the possibility of forging regional or global alliances against terrorist groups.⁷ One of the ways to deal with the problems in the region is to devise a framework ensuring regional security and cooperation. An improved bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan is crucial to that effort.

Second, recent events indicate that Afghanistan has emerged as a source of competition between India and Pakistan.⁸ This potentially hinders the efforts of the international community to provide stability in Afghanistan. Third, there still exists a potential for another crisis between India and Pakistan, with nuclear overtones, which could require diplomatic intervention from outside powers. Another catastrophic

terrorist attack, like the Mumbai attacks in 2008, or a prominent political assassination in India, could push back the relationship to the dark days of 2001–02 when the two countries were on the verge of a war. Although Indian analysts are loath to admit it, there is a fear in the international community, especially in the United States, that a conflict between the two nations could escalate to the nuclear level.⁹

Finally, prospects for economic growth, trade agreements, and energy pipelines in South Asia can be considerably enhanced with normalization of relations between these two countries. Indeed, the past and the future of South Asia have been and will be shaped by the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan.

In this paper it is argued that Indian and Pakistani security managers have three incentives to cooperate: institutional learning from previous crises, changing threat assessments, and the potential for economic growth and development. However, due to the problem of Kashmir, terrorist attacks in India, difficulties associated with regime types in both countries, institutional mistrust, and an emerging competition over natural resources, there is a possibility of a return to the past—with the added twist of Afghanistan emerging as a crucial battlefield. The overall assessment, then, is that “ugly stability”¹⁰ will continue to define India-Pakistan relations and that dramatic breakthroughs, though possible, are improbable. The international community, and the United States in particular, have been supportive of the peace process, but more needs to be done by both countries to stabilize regional security.

The first section describes different schools of thought and their impact in shaping India’s strategy towards Pakistan. Section two analyzes the recent changes in the bilateral relationship and focuses on the factors that are pushing the countries to cooperate. The next section examines the constraints that inhibit improved bilateral relations. This is followed by an explanation of the benefits of engagement versus containment or hedging in relation to Indian national interests. However, engagement is unlikely with continued terrorist attacks in India and, hence, in the penultimate section, some brief policy recommendations for both countries are made. The concluding argument states that, without structural changes and bold political decisions, an “ugly stability” is likely to continue.

India's Pakistan Strategy: "To Contain or Engage or . . ."*"We will always have Pakistan!"*Former Indian Army Chief, May 2008¹¹

Does India have the level of interagency coordination that qualifies an assumption of one central strategy towards Pakistan? Or do different institutions within the government follow different strategies in their dealings with Pakistan? Despite the seemingly contradictory approaches to Pakistan, India, in fact, has a top down approach in favor of interagency supervision, if not coordination, that allows the assumption of one coherent strategy. At the apex, foreign policy in India is formulated by elected political authorities who then use the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to execute their policies. In practice, most major foreign policy initiatives are handled by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).¹² Further, the MEA is a strong bureaucracy that plays the role of a gatekeeper to most, if not all, foreign interactions—particularly important neighboring states. Hence, most other bureaucracies that interact with Pakistan, like the Commerce Ministry, Home Ministry, Defense Ministry, Water and Transport Ministries, and others can only do so with approval from the PMO and the MEA. Admittedly, as in other democracies, different institutions lobby and jostle for power and influence, but eventually the Cabinet and the PMO makes all important decisions. Thus, a combination of political direction and bureaucratic procedures suggest that an assumption of a coherent, well considered Indian strategy towards Pakistan is not farfetched.

Most Indian strategists, as discussed later in this section, favor a policy of reconciliation and stability vis-à-vis Pakistan that, once and for all, decouples India from its neighbor and allows the country to assume its "predestined" role as a global power. However, some in India advocate a parallel strategy of containing, or even bypassing, Pakistan and to guard against future irresponsible behavior from a "perennially unstable" Pakistan. As a consequence India, while working towards peace and stability in the subcontinent, is also investing in options that can minimize the risks and consequences of a breakdown in relations between the two countries. The following section describes the two main schools of thought, and their differences, in

Indian policies towards Pakistan. Finally, a description of the current Indian strategy of hedging, which is a combination of the two strategies employed *simultaneously* towards Pakistan.

Engagement. The policy of engagement is favored by the Indian Left as well as some sections of the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Expanding trading links and economic growth, people-to-people ties, and other elements of soft power lies at the heart of this strategy. It aims to change Pakistani attitudes towards India and create friendly lobbies composed of traders, merchants, artists, and intellectuals in both countries. The driving rationale is that common economic growth and development will alleviate narrow security competition and achieve a win-win situation.¹³

An implicit assumption of this school is that a weak, military-dominated, and insecure Pakistan is not in India's interest, and instead India should support democracy and democratization in Pakistan. This strategy is predominantly favored by what Kanti Bajpai characterizes as the Nehruvian school of thought.¹⁴ According to Bajpai, "the Nehruvian diagnosis rests on a view that enmity and hostility towards India come from misunderstanding and delusion . . . The enemy image of India sustained and elaborated by the feudals and the military is also false."¹⁵ According to the author, the three policy implications of this school of thought are: to prepare adequately for defense, trust in treaties and international laws, and wean Pakistan away from the influence of external powers. The "weaning away" strategy follows the post-independence worldview of keeping great powers away from the subcontinent.¹⁶ In other words, India can and will look after its own neighborhood. This argument implies, with some justification, that external powers have played a destabilizing role in the region. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, for instance, supports an "intelligent disengagement" of the US from Pakistani politics.¹⁷ However, this school of thought ignores or downplays instances where external powers have acted as a stabilizing force; for example, the role played by the US during the 1999 Kargil war, the 2001–02 "twin peaks" crisis, and in toppling the Taliban regime and its ongoing nation building efforts in Afghanistan. Interestingly, for the most part, even those who support full-fledged engagement with Pakistan support continued military preparedness to guard against possible Pakistani adventurism.

Containment. The main assumption of this strategy is that, due to its inherent contradictions, the Pakistani state will continue to witness instability and unrest with uncertain outcomes, and India should therefore follow policies that can insulate it, as far as possible, from Pakistan's uncertain future.¹⁸ This can be done by investing in trade and economic links that bypass Pakistan, primarily by reaching out to Iran and Afghanistan. The international community, including the US, China, Turkey, the EU, and others should be lobbied to support policies that force Pakistan to act responsibly and, more or less, accept the current status quo in the region. On this point they differ from those that seek to insulate the region from the influence of external powers. Militarily, India should be prepared to prevent and defeat any adventurism by the Pakistan army and its surrogate militant *tanzeems*.¹⁹ Without opposing economic relations per se, proponents of this school argue that India can, and should, bypass the problem of Pakistan and concentrate on its own economic growth and military modernization. This would place India in a position to economically, militarily, and diplomatically leave Pakistan behind and, subsequently, use its overwhelming leverage to stare it down. While this policy may appear attractive, as it does not impose any costs on India, it ignores the problems that can be caused by Pakistan, not just in Kashmir but in further destabilizing the region.

Two other variants that can, arguably, be subsumed under the containment school are the coercion and, its more extreme variant, the destruction schools of thought.²⁰ The coercion school believes that by a combination of military, economic, and diplomatic posturing India can isolate and force Pakistan to settle for the status quo.²¹ As evidence of the success of coercive diplomacy, proponents stress upon the border mobilization of 2001–02 which, according to them, compelled President Pervez Musharraf to renounce support for militant groups in his famous speech on January 12, 2002.²² However, they overlook the inconvenient fact that despite the speech Pakistan continued to support militant groups operating against India. The destruction school, obviously, believes that India's geopolitical goals can only be realized once Pakistan is broken into separate provinces, preferably along its ethnic fault lines.²³ This argument, in turn, feeds Pakistani insecurity and is touted as evidence of India's eternal, almost existential, hostility. Grouping these three seemingly separate approaches together may seem like a conceptual overstretch, but reflects the confusion,

with regard to the desired end-state for Pakistan, within those who advocate containment itself.²⁴ For instance, C. Raja Mohan, while describing the containment policy, writes that “India would make Pakistan engage in an arms race until Pakistan is ruined. The policy assumes that Pakistan is determined to self-destruct and all India has to do is ‘help’ it along.”²⁵

Hedging. India’s current strategy, a combination of the previous two, can best be understood as one of hedging.²⁶ Continuing its military modernization, India is simultaneously engaging Pakistan economically while investing in infrastructures that bypass Pakistan, should the relationship deteriorate. Hence, on the one hand, the Indian government is encouraging commercial and social links between Pakistan and bordering states in India. But at the same time, with a denial of overland trading access to Afghanistan, India is building the capacity to trade with Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chah Bahar.²⁷ Thus, in case relations with Pakistan do not normalize, India is pursuing alternative strategies to gain trading and energy access to Central Asia. Moreover, India does not see a role for outside powers unless such interference works to its advantage. Thus, the US, China, EU and other important countries, like Saudi Arabia, should acknowledge the problem in Pakistan and are expected to work with India.²⁸ This hedging strategy is viewed by some as indicative of the confusion within India regarding Pakistan. Hence, while India would like to enjoy the benefits of a “normalized” relationship, it is afraid that a strong Pakistan would continue to support militancy and offer resistance to the attainment of Indian geopolitical goals. Currently, in light of the deteriorating security conditions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, some Indian security managers believe that a stable and strong Pakistan is needed to insulate and, ironically, protect India.²⁹

Ultimately, and unsurprisingly, it has been claimed by India that their policies towards Pakistan are dependent upon the policies adopted by Pakistan. If Pakistan accepts the current status quo, with some limited concessions on Kashmir; stops supporting terrorist groups operating in India; and acts decisively to eliminate the Islamist threat in its own territory, then India would, in turn, work with Pakistan to normalize relations and focus upon economic development. Further, according to the Indian view, the security competition-driven narrative has to end, as it acknowledges that

unresolved issues with Pakistan will inhibit India's self-perceived status as a global power.

After War: Changing Contours of the Bilateral Relationship

Have India-Pakistan relations, mirroring the experience of the super-powers after the Cuban missile crisis, achieved a breakthrough after the 1999 Kargil war and the 2001–2002 border mobilization crises? This article argues that for three main reasons the two countries are attempting to develop closer bilateral relations and cooperate rather than compete. The first reason is institutional learning from the two crises, which forced a fundamental rethink in certain sections of the political and, crucially, bureaucratic classes in both countries. The second reason is the changing external and internal threat assessments and their impact on decision-makers in both countries. As subsequently argued, Indian and Pakistani security managers have been forced by recent events to address internal threats and potential problems with other powers, namely China and the US. Finally, an emphasis on trade, economic growth, business links, and linkages between civil societies is creating significant lobbies that are pushing for changing the discourse of bilateral competition. This is in keeping with economic theories of globalization that predict “positive political externalities” arising from increased interaction between states and markets.³⁰

The post-crisis peace process. The 1999 Kargil intrusion by Pakistani troops across the LOC not only surprised the Indian army, but also came as a shock to Pakistani diplomats and the foreign ministry.³¹ While the Pakistani military attempted to legitimize the act by stressing upon how it internationalized the Kashmir conflict and gave a filip to the insurgency, the Kargil War proved that forcing territorial concessions from India through military operations was a failed idea. According to a RAND Corporation study, one of the lessons of Kargil was that, “Pakistan now views Kargil-like operations as an ineffective means of dispute resolution.”³² However, its authors also add a crucial caveat—“the significance of this conclusion, however, is limited by the fact that many stakeholders in Pakistan *simultaneously* believe that Kargil can be seen as a victory of sorts.”³³ The problem of many stakeholders in Pakistan still persists, and will be analyzed in the next section, but it is important to note that for most Pakistanis the military option with respect to India lay discredited.³⁴

The border mobilization crisis of 2001–2002 internalized the same message for the Indian security elite. Most Indian policy makers began to understand the limits of military force and the dangers of escalation in a nuclear environment. India’s reluctance to put into effect the “Cold Start” doctrine subsequently developed stems, in part, from this sentiment—that conventional war in the subcontinent is too risky and unlikely to attain the stated political objective of ending cross border terrorism.³⁵ As a result of this, and other developments in the region, India embraced the peace process in search of common ground. According to former Indian National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, “it is only after the mobilization of 2002 that the peace process could begin. This was the realization: Having gone to the brink, a more rational view prevailed.”³⁶

Besides the willingness to engage in the composite dialogue to normalize bilateral relations, there are two other indicators of institutional preferences for cooperation over competition in both countries. First, despite repeated terrorist attacks in India, the government has refrained from immediately blaming Pakistan, as was the norm earlier, and has instead continued apace with the composite dialogue.³⁷ Even in the two instances when the viability of the composite dialogue was threatened—after the Mumbai train blasts in 2006 and the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008—Indian officials have made extra efforts, despite domestic criticism, to continue with the process. At most, they have blamed the attacks on so-called “rogue institutions” like the Inter Services Directorate (ISI) or certain sections of the military.³⁸ Of course, this position was untenable following the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai which was clearly traced back to Pakistan, forcing the government to “pause” the composite dialogue. Second, there has been a conscious decision by bureaucracies in both countries to increase the bandwidth of interaction across different ministries and institutions. The composite dialogue, for instance, involves officials from the Transportation, Energy, Home, and External Affairs Ministries. Also, the Ministry of Defense, for the first time since independence, has allowed quasi-official Indian and Pakistani think tanks to develop institutional linkages and facilitate scholar exchange programs.³⁹

Changing threat assessment and environment. The second factor that has forced both nations to search for cooperative strategies is the

changing internal and external threat environments. According to Pakistani news sources, around 1,100 Pakistani soldiers have died battling non-state actors within their own territory over the last five years.⁴⁰ The spread of Talibanization in Pakistan has engaged its army—episodically, and with mixed results—in a number of internal security missions, leading former president Pervez Musharraf to declare that “the real threat to the stability of Pakistan is internal.”⁴¹ This sentiment has carried on to the administration of President Zardari, who has called the battle against terrorism a fight for “Pakistan’s soul,”⁴² and claims that “India has never been a threat to Pakistan.”⁴³ The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and suicide bomb attacks, especially the bombing of the Marriot Hotel and the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in major Pakistani cities has helped in focusing attention on this problem. Indeed, judging by the English language press, a significant section of Pakistan’s intelligentsia is aware of the danger, and wants the state to do more.⁴⁴ However, it is, as yet, unclear whether Pakistan has discarded its previous strategy of investing in militant groups to pursue its goals vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan.⁴⁵ On the contrary, there is some evidence that the Pakistani military is playing a sophisticated “double game.”⁴⁶ Despite such allegations, most Pakistani leaders and analysts agree that Pakistan faces a formidable internal security threat.

In addition to militant groups challenging the “writ of the state,” the presence of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan has further complicated the security scenario for Pakistan. While military-to-military relations between Pakistan and foreign troops in Afghanistan appear to be good at the strategic and operational level, there are problems, and fears, at the tactical level. For instance, there have been numerous instances where Pakistani and NATO forces have exchanged fire across the Durand Line.⁴⁷ One outcome of these developments is that Pakistan has had to shift focus and resources away from its Eastern border with India towards its western border with Afghanistan.

Similarly, India faces a number of internal and external challenges. The growth and geographical spread of the Naxalite movement in central India led Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare it as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”⁴⁸ According to some reports, left-wing extremism affects 165 districts, around 30 percent of the districts in India.⁴⁹ Currently, there

are two clear trends with respect to the Naxalite movement—violence, measured in absolute terms, has increased since 2003. Second, the response of the state police forces has been inconsistent with dramatic improvements in some states, like Andhra Pradesh, and deteriorating conditions in others, like Orissa and Chhattisgarh (See Table 1). Worryingly, there are some reports that the movement is spreading into urban areas.⁵⁰ In addition to the rise in left wing extremism, there has also been an upsurge in separatist violence in Assam and Manipur over the last five years.⁵¹ Finally, a number of unsolved terrorist attacks, some claimed by Islamist terrorist groups like the “Indian Mujahedeen,” outside the traditional battle ground of Kashmir, have unnerved Indian police and intelligence agencies.⁵² While they have been quick to blame transnational terror organizations operating out of Pakistan or Bangladesh, there is little doubt that local support was crucial for these attacks. This indicates an alarming growth of a homegrown Islamist radical movement in India. The implications of the spread of this movement are immense. In sum, policy makers in Delhi have been forced to devote attention, and resources, to deal with internal security problems.

The other threat that has been engaging Indian national security agencies arises from the activities and diplomatic positions taken by

TABLE 1
STATE WISE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES IN 2003–2007 DUE TO
NAXAL VIOLENCE IN INDIA

| State | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Incidents (Casualties) | Incidents (Casualties) | Incidents (Casualties) | Incident (Casualties) | Incident (Casualties) |
| Andhra Pradesh | 577(140) | 310(74) | 535(208) | 183(47) | 138(45) |
| Bihar | 250(128) | 323(171) | 186(96) | 107(45) | 135(67) |
| Chhattisgarh | 256(74) | 352(83) | 385(168) | 715(388) | 582(369) |
| Jharkhand | 342(117) | 379(169) | 312(119) | 310(124) | 482(157) |
| Madhya Pradesh | 13(1) | 13(4) | 20(3) | 6(1) | 9(2) |
| Maharashtra | 75(31) | 84(15) | 94(53) | 98(42) | 94(25) |
| Orissa | 49(15) | 35(8) | 42(14) | 44(9) | 67(17) |
| Uttar Pradesh | 13(8) | 15(26) | 10(1) | 11(5) | 9(3) |
| West Bengal | 6(1) | 11(15) | 14(7) | 23(17) | 32(6) |
| Kerala | 12 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 8 |
| Karnataka | 4 | 6(1) | 8(8) | 10 | 7(5) |
| Haryana | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Tamil Nadu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 1597(515) | 1533(566) | 1608(677) | 1509(678) | 1565(696) |

(Annexure IV: Annual report 2007–2008, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, pp. 142).

China, and the problems of the disputed boundary on India's eastern borders. The rise of China, the increase in its military and political power, and its future ambitions are, expectedly, attracting significant attention in Indian military circles. For instance, in a widely publicized interview the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, claimed Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang in particular, to be a part of Chinese territory.⁵³ Further, alleged Chinese "incursions" across the disputed boundary and in what India considers the "settled" area of Sikkim has led to periodic rising of military tensions amidst a flurry of diplomatic exchanges.⁵⁴ Finally, China's logistical and infrastructural development, especially the building of railways and road networks in Tibet, has increased its ability to project power on the Indo-Chinese border, forcing Indian officials to pay more attention to the country's eastern borders.⁵⁵

Accordingly, one of the biggest developments in the Indian military in recent times has been its focus on matching China's military buildup and capabilities. To deal with increased border tensions, the Indian military is in the process of raising two new mountain divisions, is acquiring additional weaponry, and has activated old airfields.⁵⁶ In addition, there has been a special emphasis on building infrastructure, including road and communications links, within the border areas.⁵⁷ In response to the recent Chinese anti-satellite test, the Indian Ministry of Defense created a special tri-service "space cell."⁵⁸ The Indian navy views with concern growing Chinese naval capabilities, China's potential to operate in the Indian Ocean region and other signs of the "string of pearls strategy."⁵⁹ Due to these developments, and with an eye towards gearing for a potential China threat, all three services are pushing for modernization funds and enhanced budgets. This could, at one level, be explained as bureaucratic maximization of funds, posts, and weapon systems. However, at another level, it is clear that recent developments vis-à-vis China have forced Indian military planners to prepare for worst-case scenarios which, in turn, increase apprehensions within China, suggesting that both countries appear to be locked in a security dilemma.⁶⁰ This is expected to increase as a mutual hedging strategy plays out, with increasing Chinese distrust of the US-India strategic partnership and Indian fears about Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh, and other countries. In short, insecurity arising from the rise of China is playing an important role in shaping the Indian defense perspective.

The effect of these developments on the India-Pakistan dyad, however, is curious. A changing internal and external threat environment is creating constituencies in both countries that wish to transform the bilateral narrative. The rise of other dangers is creating incentives for the security elite in both countries to cooperate rather than compete. However, complicating this issue is that threats for one nation often generate from an ally or a potential ally of the other. Hence, China—viewed in India as a potential threat—is an “all-weather” friend of Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan is suspicious of Indian ties with Afghanistan and is alarmed by the emerging US-India strategic partnership. These dynamics, as discussed later, are creating new forms of competition between India and Pakistan.

The business of peace. The third set of factors that has an impact on bilateral relations between India and Pakistan is the combination of increasing trade, business links, and people-to-people contact.⁶¹ To be sure, it is easy to overstate this point as Indians and Pakistanis have traditionally shared good personal and cultural relations. Moreover, there have been numerous instances in the past, like the Lahore bus yatra in 1999 or the Agra summit in 2001, where hopes were raised about the peace process, only to be dashed by subsequent events. However, the scope of current business and trading links, expanding cultural ties, and increased interactions between elements of civil society indicate a change from the past. Crucially, there is a broad political consensus in both countries that favors developing such links. For instance, India’s decision to engage with Pakistan and further the peace process was undertaken by the BJP-dominated National Democratic Alliance (NDA) administration and carried forward by Congress-dominated United Progressive Alliance (UPA) administration. Similarly, after the recently concluded elections in Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) alliance is continuing the dialogue process initiated during the Musharraf-Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) regime. The bipartisan process is helped, in part, by the institutional preference for developing these ties, as mentioned earlier.

These measures have, in turn, created three influential lobbies that facilitate the normalization process. The first is the business communities in both countries that benefit from increased cross border trade.⁶² While the volume of trade, in absolute terms, between the two

countries is low, the potential for growth and its impact on Pakistan's economy is immense. According to a news report, India could emerge as Pakistan's second largest non-oil trading partner.⁶³ Indeed, while examining the low volume of trade between the two countries, E. Sridharan predicts that the "the real scope for trade and investment is in the future and begins now."⁶⁴

One of the most promising, though largely under-utilized, areas of economic cooperation is in the energy sector with Pakistan's potential role as a transportation hub.⁶⁵ On this issue, India is in a difficult bind. It needs assured energy supplies for economic growth and is interested in gaining access to oil and gas reserves in Central Asia and Iran. However, any overland oil or gas pipeline would have to pass through unstable areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, such a project, in the event of a crisis, would provide strategic leverage to Pakistan. Liberals in both countries argue that these could be pipelines of peace, creating incentives for both countries to cooperate and maintain regional stability. However, security fears emanating from institutional mistrust, regional instability, and uncertainty about funding and supply issues has prevented any meaningful progress on these issues. The second lobby pushing the peace process is comprised of regional actors that benefit from a normalization of ties. Alyssa Ayres's argues, perhaps a little optimistically, that "the new spirit of Punjabiyat" can help transcend "the problem of incompatible nationalities" and lead to improved relations.⁶⁶ The opening of rail and trading links in Punjab, Rajasthan, and Kashmir has led to hopes that it will revive, to some extent, pre-partition trade and travel links, leading to greater employment. This has created a demand from residents of border areas, traders and religious pilgrims in both countries to continue with the peace process. Finally, civil society organizations in India and Pakistan, including journalists, artists, human rights activist, and sportspersons, have formed cross border linkages in their attempt to change the narrative of competition. Most prominently, at least in the popular imagination, the entertainment industries in both countries are producing films challenging the conventional narrative of enmity. Screening of such films and increased collaborations between artists and production crews of the two countries are playing a role, however small, of changing popular perceptions.

To conclude, three significant developments are pushing India and Pakistan towards cooperation: institutional learning, changing threat

environment, and an emphasis on economic development. These developments have, in turn, led bureaucrats and politicians on both sides to explore avenues to further stability and economic development. However, as the next section shows, due to structural constraints and in the absence of strong political leadership, the bilateral relationship is unlikely to achieve a dramatic breakthrough.

Before Peace: The Constraints That Inhibit Improved Bilateral Relations

Hopes for peace between India and Pakistan have risen time and again. Historically, after a crisis or a war, both countries have attempted, with mixed results, to resolve their problems (see Table 2).

TABLE 2
INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES, PEACE PROCESSES, AND RESULTS

| Year and crisis | Peace process | Results |
|------------------------------------|--|---|
| 1947–48 First Kashmir war | Ceasefire; India approaches the UN for a resolution | UN resolution appoints a commission but neither India nor Pakistan carry out its mandate |
| 1951 war scare | Nehru-Ali talks of 1953 | Despite commitments for resolving Kashmir, talks founder once Pakistan signs defense treaty with US |
| 1965 Second Kashmir war | Tashkent Agreement | Both sides agree to return to status quo |
| 1971 Bangladesh war | Shimla Agreement | Release of Pakistani POWs, conversion of Ceasefire Line (CFL) into Line of Control (LOC) and agreement to resolve problems bilaterally. |
| 1987 Brasstacks crisis | “Cricket diplomacy” leading to Secretary-level talks on confidence building and war prevention | 1988 Agreement on Non-attack on nuclear facilities signed, and first Prime Ministerial hotline established. |
| 1990 Compound crisis | Prime Ministers of both countries meet during SAARC summit and agree to resume talks at Foreign Secretary level. | Numerous military confidence building measures (CBM) agreed upon. This culminates in the first round of composite dialogue after 1994. |
| 1998 Nuclear tests | Lahore peace process | Though the Lahore declaration is signed, limited war soon breaks out within months in Kargil. |
| 1999 Kargil war | Agra summit | Talks collapse without agreement |
| 2001–02 Border Mobilization crisis | Composite dialogue | Five rounds of composite dialogue have been held on a large number of issues. Though some progress has been made on confidence building measures, difficult issues remain unresolved. |

The current round of composite dialogue remains the most ambitious and protracted yet, but has had little to show in terms of concrete and long-lasting results.

There are six main impediments to improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan—institutional mistrust, problems arising from the nature of the regimes in countries, Kashmir, terrorist attacks in India, a competitive relationship in Afghanistan, and an emerging competition over natural resources.

Institutional Mistrust

In contrast to the institutional preference for normalization of ties is the absence of trust that is used by portions of the political-bureaucratic elite in both countries to argue against making major concessions. Conservative elements in both countries point towards past instances of deception, and by publically playing upon such fears increase the political risks of moderation for decision-makers. Not surprisingly, the mistrust comes mainly from the security establishment, consisting of the armed forces and intelligence organizations.

In the case of India, the mistrust is stronger in the military because of their previous unpleasant experiences of dealing with Pakistan. Past instances of deception like the so-called tribal invasion of 1948 and Pakistan army infiltration during the 1965 war pale in comparison to the effect of the 1999 Kargil and the decade old “proxy” war, initially in Punjab and, with greater intensity, in Kashmir.⁶⁷ The costs of battling Pakistani-trained and, later, Pakistani militants have been borne mainly by the security forces. Since the outbreak of the Kashmiri insurgency in 1990, including casualties from the Kargil war, approximately 5,000 members of the Indian security forces have been killed.⁶⁸ The majority of the deaths (over 65 percent) occurred after 1998, when insurgency in the valley shifted from indigenous roots to acquire its current pan-Islamic jihadi characteristics. This shift was facilitated by the increasing influence of Pakistani-based and manned groups like the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and Jaish-e-Mohhammad (JEM). The Pakistani army itself was relatively unaffected during this phase, except for casualties suffered in direct border clashes along the LOC and during the Kargil war which were, more or less, proportional to Indian casualties. Thus, an entire generation of military officers in India views the Pakistan army and its covert support of jihadi organizations as the most significant and

destabilizing security problem in the subcontinent.⁶⁹ This radicalization of the Indian officer class and its mistrust of the Pakistani army have led them, in part, to oppose directly and through media leaks what they perceive as unconditional and risky civilian initiatives in support of the peace process. For instance, the Indian army adapted an uncharacteristically vocal and public posture to oppose two major initiatives that were supposed to further the peace process: troop withdrawals from Siachen and from counterinsurgency duties from certain parts of Kashmir. To be sure, they were not directly challenging civilian authority but, on the contrary, were encouraged and, more importantly, allowed to do so by influential bureaucratic and political lobbies which shared their mistrust.⁷⁰ However, in a usually “silent” and submissive bureaucracy that prides itself on being “apolitical,” it was a departure for it to take a public stance on a policy issue.⁷¹ More recently, reflecting the extent of the mistrust, according to Prem Shankar Jha, a backchannel agreement on Kashmir was “met with determined opposition from the home and security establishments in the government even though it had conceded 95 per cent of India’s conditions.”⁷²

In the case of Pakistan, their main fear stems from India’s apparent unwillingness to alter the status quo in Kashmir and its alleged aid to Pakistan’s secessionist movements, reviving past memories of Indian involvement in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. One of the main Pakistani suspicions is that despite engaging in the peace process, India does not want to make any significant concession on Kashmir, or any other consequential issue like Siachen or Sir Creek.⁷³ Instead, Pakistani diplomats fear that as the stronger and emerging global power, India is deflecting pressure and attention from the international community. Ultimately, Pakistan can either appeal to the international community, especially the United States, for arbitration or convince India to alter the status quo as a price for normalizing relations, allowing the free flow of trade and stabilizing the region. These fears are compounded by allegations, mainly from the security community, that India is intent on a further Balkanization of Pakistan. Thus, their security managers see an Indian hand behind every anti-state movement—from Sindh to Baluchistan and even the unrest in FATA that, according to Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, is being engineered by India.⁷⁴ It is entirely possible, though difficult to either prove or refute, that Indian intelligence agencies are aiding some of these movements. However, it can also be argued that such

claims are self-serving, as it allows the state to malign legitimate ethno-regional movements in the name of national security.

The sum total of these fears means that when faced with setbacks, such as terrorist attacks or unfulfilled expectations, peace initiatives are quickly replaced by traditional, hostile postures.

Regime types. The different types of regimes in South Asia create another set of complications. In the case of Pakistan, hybrid regimes, defined by Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay and Julian Schofield as either “[the] military using democratic means to legitimize itself or popularly elected governments functioning under the threat of military intervention,”⁷⁵ have impacted the bilateral relationship on two main issues. The first is the variable impact that they have had on conflict escalation and prevention. Tremblay and Schofield argue that they have either escalated conflicts (under a civilian administration) or have actually provided opportunities for progress towards peace (under military rule). For instance, the Kargil war was launched under the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif, while General Pervez Musharraf, as President, made the most far reaching proposals with regard to the Kashmir dispute. The second issue is the problem of control of major foreign and defense policies. Most observers agree that major foreign and defense policies, most notably the Kashmir and Afghanistan policies and control of nuclear weapons, are owned by the Pakistani army and not, as is the case with “normal” democracies, by elected politicians or civilian bureaucrats.⁷⁶ According to Ashley Tellis, “the Pakistan military continues to remain pre-eminent in national security decision making.”⁷⁷ This has had a direct impact on India-Pakistan relations, as Pakistani civilian governments have found it hard to challenge or even control the security driven narrative, since they risk appearing weak on national security. Lack of political stability and absence of strong civilian bureaucracies have also played a role in strengthening the influence of the Pakistani military. Complicating the issue of ownership over national security policies is the problem of numerous stakeholders in implementing such policies. For instance, Pakistan’s secretive policy of using militants groups to fight in Kashmir and against the Afghanistan government has led to an element of deniability and ambiguity with regard to controlling the activities of these groups. The links between civilian contractors who allegedly run these groups and the ISI are not properly understood. According to

Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason, “with the collaboration of elements within one of Pakistan’s secret intelligence services, the ISI, the Pashtun borderlands have become a safe haven for the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist elements.”⁷⁸ Hence, a combination of imbalanced civil-military relations, political instability, weak civilian bureaucracies, and the problem of numerous stakeholders in Pakistan, makes it difficult for a civilian government to accept and implement politically risky decisions vis-à-vis India.

In the case of India, there are different political dynamics in place that constrain the ability of a coalition government to push through a peace deal.⁷⁹ This applies, particularly, to the Congress-dominated UPA. The Congress party’s attitude towards Pakistan has historically been ambivalent. On the one hand, the Congress claims to be a protector of India’s secular ideals and, by extension, its minority Muslims. On the other hand, Pakistan is born out of Jinnah’s “two nations” theory which is a direct challenge to the Congress’s ideals. Indeed, three out of India’s four wars with Pakistan were waged under Congress administrations. Further, the Hindu right wing party, the BJP, finds it politically expedient to attack the Congress for being weak on terror and, by extension, towards Pakistan. Thus, domestic politics make it difficult for the Congress to accept any potentially unpopular peace deals with Pakistan. The BJP, on the other hand, has found it easier to sell a peace agreement domestically, having established a reputation as a staunchly nationalistic party.

The problem of Kashmir There has been a remarkable decrease in violence (by over 70 percent) in Indian Kashmir over the last five years (See Table 3 and Figure 1, which is a graphical representation of Table 3). However, the scale of popular protests in the summer of 2008 against Indian rule in the Kashmir valley has increased political tensions. While the large and peaceful turnout in the subsequent elections has been hailed as a triumph of Indian democracy, the problem in Kashmir persists. There are many dimensions to the Kashmir issue but the political and military aspect dominates the bilateral relationship.

Politically, India-Pakistan relations made dramatic progress over the last few years but failed to deliver at a crucial juncture. President Musharraf, in various proposals floated between 2004 and 2006, made a radical departure from Pakistan’s stated position on Kashmir by suggesting that it was willing to give up its claim over Kashmir in


TABLE 3
TRENDS OF VIOLENCE IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

| Year | Incidents | Security forces killed | Civilians killed | Terrorist skilled |
|------|-----------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1999 | 3071 | 356* | 821 | 1082 |
| 2000 | 3074 | 397 | 762 | 1520 |
| 2001 | 4522 | 536 | 919 | 2020 |
| 2002 | 4038 | 453 | 1008 | 1707 |
| 2003 | 3401 | 314 | 795 | 1494 |
| 2004 | 2565 | 281 | 707 | 976 |
| 2005 | 1990 | 189 | 557 | 917 |
| 2006 | 1667 | 151 | 389 | 591 |
| 2007 | 887 | 82 | 131 | 358 |

Note: This excludes casualties suffered in the Kargil war.
(Figures from Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), India, 2003–04 and 2007–08).

FIGURE 1
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF TABLE 3

**Trends of violence in Jammu and Kashmir,
1999-2007**



exchange for demilitarization, self-governance with joint supervision mechanism, and other measures.⁸⁰ Without publically accepting these proposals, New Delhi sought to explore other creative ideas by investing in the Track II dialogue between interlocutors Tariq Aziz and S.K. Lambah.⁸¹ According to reports, a five-point peace formula has been agreed to—“the recognition of the Line of Control (LoC) as a de facto border, cooperative management of some agreed subjects, free trade and movement, and demilitarization—all contingent on an

end to terrorism.⁸² However, due to domestic uncertainty in Pakistan, recurrent terrorist attacks in India, and subsequent protests in Jammu and Kashmir, the proposals could not be publically unveiled. This was a missed opportunity with each side blaming the other.⁸³

Recent political developments in Kashmir, and in India and Pakistan, may further harm relations between the two countries. The demonstrations in the Kashmir valley in 2008 against the allocation of land for the Amarnath yatra and the subsequent death of a Hurriyat leader have forced the Pakistani government to strike a hawkish posture. Statements from Pakistani politicians indicate that they have fallen back upon the traditional diplomatic position of implementation of the UN resolution.⁸⁴ Finally, despite positive statements in favor of the peace process by President Zardari, the current civilian government in Pakistan may be too weak domestically to strike a deal on Kashmir with India, especially one that involves any compromise on its stated position. In India too, domestic politics limits the flexibility of the UPA government. However, the renewed and convincing mandate won by the UPA administration gives it a small window of opportunity to craft an imaginative Kashmir policy. To start with, if the summer of 2009 continues to remain peaceful, then India should consider decreasing its military footprint in the valley while strengthening the capability of the state police.⁸⁵ Such a measure can change not only the anti-India narrative within Kashmir but also create opportunities in the bilateral relationship. Eventually, it will require statesmen with immense political capital and clout to sell a potential and lasting peace deal with regard to Kashmir.

From a military standpoint, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, both domestically and across the LOC, has changed dramatically over the last few years. In addition to decrease in violence in Kashmir, there have been two other positive developments. First, the ceasefire agreement, which prohibits fire across the LOC, has been successful, despite occasional stresses, since it was implemented in 2003. However, rising tensions in recent months reveal the fragility of the ceasefire.⁸⁶ The second positive development is the decrease in the level of cross-border infiltration. This is attributed, in part, to three factors. One, Pakistanis claim, is their clamping down on the activities of jihadi organizations. This could, in turn, be motivated by growing international concerns about terrorism, fear that some of these terrorist outfits have

turned against the state, or a genuine desire to give peace negotiations a chance by decreasing insurgent activities in the Kashmir Valley. Second, some of the terrorist groups operating in Indian Kashmir may have turned their attention towards waging the war against US-led forces in Afghanistan.⁸⁷ That may indeed be the case, as there are reports of Kashmiri militants groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) recruiting from Pakistan's Punjab province and operating in Afghanistan.⁸⁸ Finally, and this is a claim supported by Indians, counter-infiltration measures like the border fence and advanced surveillance equipment have succeeded in decreasing the level of infiltration. While a decrease in infiltration maybe a result of all three factors, the problems in Kashmir continue to haunt India-Pakistan relations.

Terrorist attacks. One possible explanation for the difficulty in accepting the Track II recommendations on Kashmir and for pushing the peace process to the next level is the frequency and timing of terrorist attacks in India (See Table 4). While Musharraf was floating his "trial balloons" on Kashmir, and Indian and Pakistani interlocutors were engaged in discussions, there were numerous high profile attacks in Indian cities. Most notably, the attacks in Mumbai in 2006 and in 2008 led to a rise in hostility towards Pakistan among the Indian public and made it difficult for the government to proceed with the peace process.⁸⁹ In most of these cases, the immediate response of intelligence agencies was to blame Pakistani-based groups like the LET, aided by Pakistani intelligences services. However, after the Jaipur and Ahmedabad blasts, investigative agencies are coming to the view that home-grown terror cells like the "Indian Mujahideen" are a possibility.⁹⁰ Despite admitting that possibility, the 2008 Mumbai attacks significantly affected the bilateral relationship. While there were numerous intelligence and policing failures, the commando-style raid, the targets, and the media coverage of the attacks marked a collective national trauma. The Pakistani response, though slow and halting, of arresting the main accused is encouraging. Developments since then suggest tentative steps towards evidence-sharing between law enforcement agencies. Ultimately, the manner in which Pakistan responds to the Mumbai attacks has the potential to disproportionately influence India's near term policy.⁹¹

To put it in context, however, India-Pakistan relations have been held hostage to terrorist attacks in India, especially as they are seen to

TABLE 4
MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN INDIA DURING UPA REGIME*

| Date and location | Details of attack | Impact on India-Pakistan relations |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| October 29, 2005, New Delhi | Three bombs placed in busy New Delhi markets on Diwali-eve kill 62 | PM Manmohan Singh alleges "external linkages" for the attack but talks continue. |
| March 7, 2006 Varanasi | Bombs at a railway station and a temple in Varanasi kill 20 | LET and HUJI blamed, but no major impact on bilateral relations |
| July 11, 2006 Mumbai | Bombs on Mumbai's suburban trains kill 187 and injure 700 | India postpones foreign secretary level talks, as part of the composite dialogue |
| Sept 8, 2006 Malegaon | 30 dead in twin blasts at a mosque in Malegaon | Nil. Recent news reports indicate involvement of Hindu right wing elements. |
| Feb 19, 2007 | Bombs placed in the Samjhautha Express kills 66 passengers | Nil. |
| May 18, 2007 Hyderabad | A bomb at Mecca mosque in Hyderabad kills 11 | Nil |
| Aug 25, 2007 Hyderabad | 30 dead, 60 hurt in Hyderabad blasts | Nil, although Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, blamed terrorist groups operating from Bangladesh and Pakistan. |
| Oct 11, 2007 Ajmer | 2 killed in a blast inside Ajmer Sharif shrine in Rajasthan | Nil. Some news reports link Hindu right wing elements with this incident. |
| Nov. 23, 2007 Uttar Pradesh | Six consecutive blasts in Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad kill around 26 persons | Nil. |
| Jan 1, 2008 Rampur, UP | Terrorist strike on CRPF camp in Rampur kills eight | Nil |
| May 13, 2008 Jaipur | 65 killed, 150 injured as serial blasts rock Jaipur | No impact on bilateral relations, India refrains from accusing Pakistan based groups for attack. Claimed by "Indian Mujahideen" |
| July 25, 2008 Bangalore | Seven blasts strike the IT city of Bangalore killing two people and wounding at least 20. | Nil |
| July 26, 2008 Ahmedabad | 17 bombs strike marketplaces and residential areas in Ahmedabad killing 49 and wounds over 100 | Indian foreign secretary claims that the composite dialogue is "under stress". Blasts claimed by "Indian Mujahideen" |
| Sept 13, 2008 New Delhi | 5 bombs explode in public places in Delhi killing 30 and injuring 90 | Nil. Claimed by "Indian Mujahideen" |
| Nov 26-29, 2008 Mumbai | Simultaneous attacks at prominent Mumbai landmarks carried out by sea-borne terrorists from Pakistan kill around 180 civilians. | Public outrage in India. Composite dialogue "paused." India shares evidence linking attacks to elements in Pakistan with the international community |

*(Excluding incidents by Naxalite and various NE insurgent outfits).

be connected to Pakistani intelligence agencies. Moreover, the spread of radical Islamist ideology in support of terror (as represented by the Indian Mujahideen manifesto) and the relative ease of communication, recruitment, and training, all suggest that the "infrastructures" of terror

are simultaneously globalizing. The implications of this, both in India and Pakistan and for the peace process, are ominous.

Competition in Afghanistan

Historians would be quick to point out that the India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan is not a new development. Their rivalry for power and influence in Afghanistan intensified after the end of the cold war and the subsequent US disengagement from Afghanistan. Most dramatically, India had to vacate its mission in Kabul in 1996 when the Taliban, backed by Pakistan, entered the city. India then refused to recognize the Taliban regime and, along with Iran and Russia, backed the Northern Alliance. Although Pakistan's own influence with the Taliban is a matter of some debate, the latter kept India out of Afghanistan. The US invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, and the removal of the Taliban regime, decreased Pakistani influence in Kabul. The government of President Hamid Karzai has been friendly towards India but, mindful of Pakistani sensitivities and resultant US apprehensions, has been careful not to develop a full-fledged security relationship.⁹² India, in turn, has been careful in calibrating the relationship, not wanting to provide Pakistan an opportunity to justify its support for the Afghan Taliban.⁹³ Currently, there are three broad elements to this competition—political, security, and economic.

The political dimension of the India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan revolves around the kind of regime in power in Kabul and its policies towards both countries. Pakistan, despite official statements to the contrary, viewed the pre-2005 elections Karzai regime with suspicion and, because of its origins in the Northern Alliance, labeled it as pro-India. Further, it attempted, unsuccessfully, to install moderate Taliban elements in the government under the guise of accommodating Pashtun sentiments. In recent times, Pakistan has tried to engage with the Karzai government by, among other measures, agreeing to their proposal for a grand loya-jirga, comprising tribal leaders of both countries, to isolate and divide the Taliban. However, the failure of that endeavor, combined with accusations from Afghan intelligence agencies about Pakistani involvement in the attempted assassination of President Karzai and recent attacks in Kabul, has further complicated Pakistani-Afghan relations.⁹⁴ Conveniently, despite US protestations, the Afghan insurgency is justified by most Pakistanis as a Pashtun struggle against the allegedly Tajik-dominated Afghanistan government. India, for its

part, has relied on its old association with the Northern Alliance to increase its “soft” presence—in terms of financing developmental projects, and influence primarily in the North and West of Afghanistan. Although, historically, India has had good relations with the Pashtuns—going back to the pre-independence days of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and, later, the Awami National Party (ANP), this relationship frayed and almost ended in the 1990’s with the advent of the Taliban. Thus, India’s lack of ties to Pashtuns and Pakistan’s similar predicament with the non-Pashtuns, has created a fault line influencing their policies. Realizing this, both countries are now attempting to engage previously estranged ethnic groups. However, in doing so, they reinforce the perception of a competition for political power and influence.

The security dimensions of India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan are perhaps the most controversial and, hence, most contested element of the bilateral relationship. The US invasion of Afghanistan and installation of the former Northern Alliance regime destroyed Pakistan’s theory of “strategic depth” which was, initially, meant to counter India.⁹⁵ According to Frederic Grare, “the Indian factor focuses Pakistan’s perception of Afghanistan and its policies there.”⁹⁶ The fear of Indian influence in Afghanistan, combined with an uncertainty about NATO presence in Afghanistan, drove Pakistani security managers to covertly support the Taliban’s “Quetta shura” and war lords like Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbudin Hekmatyar.⁹⁷ In turn, this policy has been justified by alleging that India is using its numerous consulates in supporting and training anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan, like the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA).⁹⁸ The presence of Indian para-military forces, such as the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) which protect Indian workers and infrastructure projects, use of the Border Roads Organization (BRO), and alleged cooperation between the nascent Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Indian security agencies, have also met the disapproval of Pakistan. For its part, as a growing and regional power, India claims a legitimate interest in the future stability of Afghanistan and argues, with some justification, that the return of the Taliban would harm India’s own security interests. Moreover, they claim that Indian aid is purely economic and their interests are best served by the emergence of a strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan. Finally, Indian security managers insist that continued Pakistani support for the Taliban in support of its own strategic depth theory is the main source of instability in Afghanistan.

The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul and the subsequent leak by US intelligence sources to the *New York Times* confirming ISI's complicity, has only served to harden the Indian position.⁹⁹ According to a senior Indian diplomat, "the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul by Pakistan's intelligence services is an act of war. Why should India react any differently from what the U.S. did after its own embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998?"¹⁰⁰ While sending Indian troops to Afghanistan to directly fight the Taliban has been ruled out for now, there are indications that India is preparing to invest in its own intelligence agencies to fight the proxy war.¹⁰¹

The economic basis of the competition is centered on Indian efforts to build an alternative transport route to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chah Bahar, which could potentially increase Indian trading and economic links to the region.¹⁰² Indian diplomats justify this route as necessary, since Pakistan denies it overland trading access to Afghanistan.¹⁰³ To overcome this geographic barrier, India also built the Zaranj-Delaram road in Afghanistan, providing it an opportunity to bypass Pakistan through Iran.¹⁰⁴ The strategic significance of an alternate road link from an Indian Ocean port to Afghanistan is potentially immense. This issue assumes added significance in light of recent incidents where Pakistan has sent mixed signals by allegedly threatening to freeze NATO logistics shipments through its territory in response to attacks on forces within Pakistani territory.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, Pakistan sees Indian plans to develop a separate access route to Central Asia through the Chah Bahar port as a direct threat to its own plans to develop Gwadar port as the main trading hub in the region, the two ports being separated by a mere 100 miles or so.¹⁰⁶

The Emerging Competition Over Natural Resources

There is a possibility of an emerging competition between India and Pakistan over natural resources, particularly water and energy supplies. According to some, Afghanistan is not a cause of India-Pakistan rivalry but is actually a symptom of an unfolding "new great game" between the two countries as they compete over energy and other natural resources in Central Asia. Robert Wirsing claims that, "rivalry over energy resources is . . . gaining steadily in importance as a driver of security strategy in the calculations of both New Delhi and Islamabad."¹⁰⁷ Further, claiming that, in part, the competition is over resources he adds "this (energy) rivalry is a serious and growing hindrance to the

international community's efforts to pacify and stabilize Afghanistan, and it exerts a powerful negative influence on Pakistan's ability and willingness to satisfy the expectations of its international allies."¹⁰⁸ Indeed, India's necessary logistical need to bypass Pakistan is feeding fears in Islamabad of a growing competition over Central Asian energy resources.¹⁰⁹ To be sure, most analysts agree that Pakistan presently lacks the capability and capacity to emerge as a rival to India with respect to energy supplies. Instead, China's appetite for energy resources—in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, is more likely to cause rivalry with India. Moreover, some argue that energy cooperation, not competition, between India and Pakistan can create a momentum that significantly furthers the peace process.¹¹⁰ The potential for India-Pakistan cooperation to jointly share energy resources exists, as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines attest.¹¹¹ However, there are formidable obstacles to realizing them, including US opposition to IPI, instability in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and Pakistan and, perhaps most importantly, a trust deficit between India and Pakistan.

A more probable source of competition between India and Pakistan is over sharing of river waters.¹¹² Sundeep Waslekar argues that water has been central to the Kashmir dispute, and Pakistan's insecurity regarding future water supplies will only increase regional instability, echoing those who predict future "water wars."¹¹³ These alarming reports are, however, tempered by the success of the Indus water treaty, which has survived overt wars and sustained hostility between the two countries. Despite that, however, recent controversy over "stolen water" from the Chenab river led President Zardari to personally intervene when he spoke about the potential for the water row to destabilize the relationship.¹¹⁴ Regardless of the present controversies, and with increasingly uncertain impact of global warming and climate change, competition over water supplies may soon emerge as an important issue between the two countries.¹¹⁵

The Engagement Strategy and Policy Recommendations for India and Pakistan

Why Engagement Trumps Hedging and Containment

On the surface, hedging seems to be the best strategy for India vis-à-vis Pakistan. It does not impose any costs on India and, moreover,

caters for worst-case scenarios—including either a hostile or even a failed Pakistan.¹¹⁶ However, the hedging strategy also means that India cannot actively shape or influence Pakistan's behavior. It also does little to assist progressive and democratic forces in Pakistan that wish to reject the narrative of competition. Hedging is thus a reactive strategy, dependent largely on Pakistan's actions. Moreover, at a time when there is a danger of the bilateral competition emerging, or further deteriorating, in non-traditional areas—Afghanistan, water sharing and access to Central Asia—the hedging strategy does nothing to obviate those possibilities. In other words, the hedging strategy increases the danger of freezing, for the foreseeable future, the narrative of competition that, in turn, prevents India from fully achieving its geopolitical goals. The policy of containment, on the other hand, may lead to uncertain and unexpected results. First, active containment and outright hostility on India's part will be matched by a Pakistani response that will only increase the instability in the region. Passive containment will achieve little, other than denying India the potential benefits that accrue from normalization. Second, containment without the cooperation of other regional and global powers is meaningless, as Pakistan can easily obviate any ill-effects. As the chances of forging an alliance between Iran, Afghanistan, US and China to contain Pakistan appear unlikely, India's containment strategy will further isolate it from Pakistan. This, in turn, will strengthen anti-Indian sentiments within Pakistan. Third, even if containment achieves its final, admittedly unstated, objective—the breakup of Pakistan—it is far from certain what the results of such an outcome will be. On the one hand, if India is explicitly involved, it will spur highly charged nationalist sentiments in Pakistan, earning their eternal enmity, including from the remnants of the Pakistani military. Besides the obvious worry about the fate of Pakistani nuclear weapons, India will also have to contend with regional instability, unchecked proliferation of small arms, and the spread of fundamentalist ideologies. Finally, India may have to contend with a refugee problem of massive proportions driven not only by violence but also economic conditions. In sum, both hedging and the containment strategy do not allow India to take advantage of recent positive political developments in Pakistan, including a return of democracy, assertive civil society, and the slow, uncertain, and erratic about turn in the traditional policy of supporting militant groups. Indeed, one of the biggest drawbacks of both hedging and

containment strategy is that it does little, if anything at all, to prevent terrorist attacks in India by militant groups operating from Pakistan.

The engagement policy potentially offers the most benefits to India in dealing with Pakistan. A number of Indian analysts advocate structural changes in the bilateral relationship, acknowledging that adversarial relations with Pakistan hinders India's ability to emerge as a global power. Most prominently, Amitabh Mattoo advocates, "systematically beginning a process of reconciliation at *every* level."¹¹⁷ Reflecting this sentiment, there are some elements within the military that advocate a "grand bargain"—some concessions on Kashmir in exchange for normalized relations, a sustained crackdown on jihadi elements and access to Central Asia.¹¹⁸ In fact the recent Pakistani offensive against the Taliban led the Indian army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor to declare that, "India was never a threat to Pakistan."¹¹⁹ Engagement also offers an opportunity for India, in cooperation with other powers, to engineer the sort of "fundamental transformation of the power structure in Pakistan"¹²⁰ that may help in normalizing the relationship. Indeed, one of the strongest advantages of engagement is that it invests in people, relationships, and institutions that can work towards peace.

However, the engagement strategy is impossible while terrorist attacks in India are perceived to enjoy the support of the Pakistani security establishment. While the Mumbai train blasts in 2006 and President Musharraf's domestic problems in 2007 derailed the Track II agreement on Kashmir, the November 2008 sea-borne attacks have paused the composite dialogue altogether. Moreover, the problem of numerous stakeholders and multiple power-centers in Pakistan makes it hard for India to engage in serious negotiations.¹²¹ In sum, India's Pakistan policy is in a difficult bind: while engagement promises to maximize pay-offs, terrorist groups operating from Pakistan and contradictions suggesting a failing Pakistan strengthen those within India who advocate hedging or containment strategies.

Policy Recommendations for Pakistan and India

There are numerous recommendations that can follow from the nine structural determinants discussed in this paper. Instead of addressing all of them, however, one major recommendation for Pakistan, four for India, and one aimed at both is offered.

Recommendation for Pakistan

Pakistani interests would be better served by withdrawing its support from militant groups. Rising US and NATO casualties in Afghanistan combined with Pakistani military casualties in operations in the North West Frontier province and terrorist attacks inside Pakistan should send a clear and unequivocal message to Pakistan that its policy of investing in, and safeguarding, militant groups for use against India in Kashmir and possibly to retain influence in Afghanistan, ought to stop.¹²² In essence, Pakistan has to completely shut down its “infrastructures of jihad,” as it not only vitiates the atmospheres with its neighbors but also has a dangerous blowback effect on its own society. Indeed, this has been increasingly acknowledged as a problem in Pakistan today. The *Daily Times*, an influential Pakistani newspaper said in an editorial:

At this juncture Pakistan must not think of reverting to policies that have failed in the past and recoiled on us through the creation of multiple centres of power within the state and civil society. Unless we are cautious, we run the risk of giving ourselves the identity of a failed-cum-rogue state with hardly anything holding together inside it. The jihadi militias held in reserve should be disbanded. The option of jihad is at an end. It is time to save the country from the clutches of the Taliban, many of whom are veterans of the Kashmir jihad.¹²³

It should be obvious that as long as Indian soldiers and citizens are dying because of militants trained in, supported by, or sheltered in Pakistan, it is difficult if not impossible for any Indian government to risk political capital by undertaking any significant peace initiatives. As part of this endeavor, Pakistan should examine disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policies for the former mujahideen and perhaps emulate such programs implemented in countries like Saudi Arabia.

Recommendations for India

(a) *Implement the Track II agreement on Kashmir.* The broad outlines of the Track II agreement on Kashmir are public knowledge, but now

that Pakistan has a civilian government, India must take the first step towards implementing them. The remarkably peaceful conduct of the recent assembly elections in Kashmir, which witnessed minimal interference from jihadi outfits, and the subsequent installation of a new chief minister, are both positive developments and a good confidence building measure. India must reciprocate the gesture by solving some of the easier issues such as Sir Creek and Siachen. On the core issue of Kashmir, there is a growing realization in India that two decades of violence in Kashmir has alienated a large number of people, especially in the valley.¹²⁴ According to Rekha Chowdhary, the Congress led UPA “did not have a Kashmir policy . . . and was ill-advised to abandon the dialogue with the separatists.”¹²⁵ While it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine India agreeing to a secession of Kashmir, the government is examining different approaches to the problem. One option that India can consider is a limited troop withdrawal from internal security operations in Kashmir commensurate with a continued, and sustained, decrease in violence.¹²⁶ This can be done tactically by relocating troops from relatively “peaceful areas” to either large bases within Kashmir or to insurgent-affected areas.¹²⁷ Moreover, as an insurance against fresh infusion of jihadi fighters from Pakistan, such a redeployment need not apply to those troops engaged in counter-infiltration duties along the Line of Control. A limited demobilization then will be a politically astute move, both regionally and diplomatically, as it will seem to reward “peaceful areas.”¹²⁸ While these issues are being debated within the security establishment, it is crucial to note that external diplomatic pressure on India with regard to the Kashmir issue can be counterproductive and undo the progress that has been made.¹²⁹ Domestic political considerations in India will make it difficult for any government to accept external interference, however well meaning.

(b) Engage with the political regime and support the efforts of the international community to strengthen Pakistani civil society. As discussed previously, imbalanced civil-military relations in Pakistan and its alleged consequences, such as a lack of control over the activities of the military and intelligence agencies, have been responsible for many of the problems in the region.¹³⁰ The return of democracy in Pakistan and the growing, though imperfect, stature of democratic institutions, like the judiciary and the media, offer the best hope for the future of

Pakistan. India must do all that it can to facilitate democracy in Pakistan and support the civilian government. As part of that measure, India should work with the international community and support measures like the proposed Biden-Lugar bill.¹³¹ Taken together, these policies may help in overturning the security driven narrative on India-Pakistan relations and allow politicians in Pakistan to control their country's foreign and defense policies. Moreover, this form of engagement will also enhance the positive bureaucratic engagement between India and Pakistan. The danger is that, in the short term, current stakeholders in Pakistan, including some military and intelligence officials, fearful of losing political power, may try to subvert this process by increasing tensions with India.

(c) Enhance trade and liberalize the visa regulations. India should, unilaterally, pursue policies that enhance regional economic integration and growth. The recent economic downturn in Pakistan creates both challenges and opportunities for India. By creating a business-friendly environment, relaxing visa regulations, and increasing the number of goods on the positive trading list, India can create further linkages between the two economies. This will also encourage Pakistan, in turn, to link its own economic prosperity with the growing Indian economy and market. Indeed, Pakistan's 2008 budget indicates a relaxed trading regime vis-à-vis India and creates opportunities for business communities on both sides.

(d) Initiate military-to-military officer exchanges. A major impediment to moving forward on any of the bilateral issues is the trust deficit on both sides. One of the ways to obviate this is to initiate military-to-military exchanges.¹³² To begin with, this could start with joint conferences organized by military educational institutions such as the National Defense College (NDC), War Colleges, and Staff Colleges. Eventually, the aim should be to enable officer exchange and interactions within these educational institutions. While this may sound fantastical to an outsider, the fact is that Indian and Pakistani military officers have enjoyed excellent rapport in numerous UN peacekeeping missions and in military training courses outside the subcontinent.¹³³ Moreover, retired officers in both countries constitute an important element of the Track II peace process and, generally, tend to temper their perspective vis-à-vis their parent organizations. It

might be fruitful to deal with the bilateral institutional mistrust by changing perceptions of mid- and senior-level officers while they are still within the service. Hence, as the first step towards building mutual trust and empathy, both of which are necessary for a lasting settlement, political leaders must push for military exchanges.

Recommendation for Both Countries

Cooperate to stabilize Afghanistan. A bilateral competition in Afghanistan for power and influence is not inevitable and can be forestalled by transparency on both sides and a cooperative arrangement that stabilizes Afghanistan. On the other hand, continued instability in Afghanistan will continue to destabilize Pakistan. As such, both Pakistan and Afghanistan have much to gain by integrating with the growing Indian economy. As part of the overall peace process, and in conjunction with other steps, Pakistan should be encouraged to grant overland trading rights between India and Afghanistan. Eventually, if all three countries can work together, Afghanistan could retain its previous historical role as the gateway between South and Central Asia, and benefit from economic trade and energy pipelines.

Conclusion

Ashley Tellis, in an influential paper written in 1997, argued that “ugly stability” is likely to characterize bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.¹³⁴ There were three main elements of this condition—nuclear deterrence will hold, wars that attain political objectives appear unlikely, and chances of premeditated conventional conflicts remain low. This paper, while analyzing the main sources of competition and cooperation, argues that this state of ugly stability will continue for the foreseeable future. Moreover, despite incentives to cooperate, the narrative of rivalry continues to dominate the relationship. Simultaneously, this paper explains how a *mutual* engagement policy benefits both countries and is being explored, tentatively and against deep skepticism, by some elements in both India and Pakistan. These efforts, however, are unlikely to achieve their goals unless Pakistan decisively and demonstratively moves against militant groups. While this may not completely terminate terrorist attacks in India, a crackdown against groups like the LET will strengthen those advocating peace in New Delhi. India, in turn, will have to find a creative way to respond

to the problem in Kashmir and send signals in support of a transformed bilateral relationship. However, complicating the issue further, there is an added danger of the India-Pakistan rivalry spinning off into new theaters of competition, namely Afghanistan. In sum, while a political deal between India and Pakistan that recasts the competitive relationship is possible, it appears unlikely.¹³⁵ It will require statesmen of courage and vision, not to mention political capital, to sell the necessary compromises to their bureaucracies and their people. Considering the current political dispensation in both countries, that possibility appears remote.

NOTES

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1. The composite dialogue refers to the peace process between India and Pakistan that started in January 2004. For a description of this, see Sameer Patil, "Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue: An Update," *IPCS Special Report* No. 53 (June 2008).
2. For an overview of recent India-Pakistan crises, see P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American engagement in South Asia* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
3. "Infrastructures of terror" is a term used by Indian officials to describe militant training and indoctrination camps in Pakistan. See "Infrastructure of terror should be dismantled: PM," *Sify News*, December 12, 2008. Accessible via <http://sify.com>.
4. See Karen DeYoung and W. Pincus, "Al-Qaeda's Gains Keep Us At Risk, Report Says," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2007. Accessible via <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. Also see Ann Scott Tyson and Robin Wright, "Mullen urges Pakistan to act on Al Qaeda," *Washington Post*, June 11, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. The unclassified version of the NIE is accessible via http://www.dni.gov/press_releases.
5. For instance, the alleged operational planner of the 9–11 terrorist attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, was arrested in Rawalpindi. Similarly, it is alleged that the plotters of the 7/7 attacks in London trained in terrorist camps in Pakistan. For a brief overview see Peter Brookes, "Flashpoint: Peril in Pakistan," *Armed Forces Journal* (June 2007). Accessible via <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com>.
6. According to one count, by the National Counterterrorism Center, India has had the highest number of terrorist attacks after Iraq from 2004–07. Accessible via <http://wits.nctc.gov>; for more on terrorism in South Asia, see Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn, "Terrorism in South Asia," *CRS Reports* No. RL 32259, August 31, 2005; Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000), pp. 115–26; and for a useful source of data on terrorist violence, see the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Accessible via <http://www.satp.org>.
7. For the problems and potential of forging an anti-terror coalition see Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with India and Pakistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004).
8. For three different views regarding this competition see Praveen Swami "Making the Water Boil in Afghanistan," *Hindu* (July 09, 2008), accessible via <http://>

- www.hindu.com; "Attacked Embassy a symbol of Indian push into Afghanistan," *Daily Times*, July 08, 2008, accessible via <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/>; also, see Somini Sengupta, "Afghan bombing sends stark message to India," *New York Times*, July 09, 2008, accessible via <http://www.nytimes.com>.
9. Some Indian analysts refute the notion that Kashmir, and the bilateral relationship, could be the source of a nuclear conflict. See Rajeev Sikri, "Misunderstanding India: Letter to the Editor," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 87, Issue 2 (March/April 2008), p. 179. Former Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had earlier argued that deterrence would also work in the sub-continent, see Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, Issue 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 41–52; also see Jaswant Singh, *A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India* (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2006), p. 341. For a more tempered Indian view that acknowledges problems with India's nuclear perceptions and doctrine, see Rajesh M. Basrur, *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). For an overview of the role of nuclear weapons in India-Pakistan crises, see P.R. Chari, "Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control and Deterrence in South Asia," *Working Paper*, Version 1.0, Stimson Center. Accessible via <http://www.stimson.org/southasia>.
 10. See Ashley Tellis, *Stability in South Asia* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).
 11. Interview by author with former Chief of Army staff, May 7, 2008.
 12. For a historical description of the role of the PMO in framing Indian foreign policy see J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2003), pp. 134–38.
 13. For more about this approach see C. Raja Mohan, "Soft borders and Cooperative Frontiers: India's Changing Territorial Diplomacy towards Pakistan and China," *Strategic Analysis* Vol. 31, No. 1 (January-February 2007), pp. 1–23.
 14. See Kanti Bajpai, "Pakistan and China in Indian strategic thought," *International Journal* (Autumn 2007), pp. 805–22.
 15. Bajpai, *International Journal*, p. 810.
 16. The term "weaning away" has been used in Bajpai, p. 811, and has also been repeatedly emphasized by some strategists in India. According to a former senior Indian military official, "India's ultimate geo-strategic goal is to wean Pakistan away from the Chinese embrace, after it has successfully weaned it away from the American embrace." Interview with former Chief of Army staff. This mindset, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, is one-sided as it ignores the benefits that accrue to Pakistan from its continued association with China and the US. Moreover, as suggested by the "weaning away" argument, India's desire for Pakistan to bandwagon, instead of balancing, reflects a legacy of the Cold War era which resisted the influence of external powers in the subcontinent.
 17. See Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Going in Two Directions in South Asia," *Current History* Vol. 107, No. 709 (May 2008), p. 207.
 18. The "containment of Pakistan" school of thought has been described in C. Raja Mohan, "Fostering Strategic Stability and Promoting Regional Cooperation," in Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, eds., *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 34.
 19. Michael Krepon characterizes India's post Kargil war policy towards Pakistan as an example of its "containment" policy. See Michael Krepon, "Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade," *Stimson Center Report*, p. 64. Accessible via <http://www.stimson.org/southasia>.
 20. Admittedly, this maybe a conceptual overstretch as advocates of containment need not necessarily believe in either the coercion or the destruction schools. For instance, containment could be followed to convince the Pakistani elites that their interests are best served by moderating its behavior towards India. However, they share some overlap in terms of assuming that Pakistan will "collapse under its own contradiction." I thank Chris Clary for this insight.
 21. For a journalistic account of India's coercive diplomacy see C. Raja Mohan, "Coercive Diplomacy: Change the Tactics," *Hindu*, January 31, 2002. For two critical views on the limits of coercive diplomacy, see Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, "The 2001–2 India-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," in Sumit Ganguly &

- Devin T. Hagerty, eds., *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 167–82; and Rajesh M. Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment: The December 13 Crisis,” in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen, eds., *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 301–25.
22. For a report on the speech, see Erik Eckholm, “The India-Pakistan Tension: Islamabad; Pakistan pledges to bar any groups linked to terror,” *New York Times*, January 13, 2002.
 23. For the best perspective on this line of thinking see Bharat Verma, “Stable Pakistan not in India’s interest,” *Indian Defence Review* Vol. 23, No. 3 (July–September 2008).
 24. There is distinction between the concept of active destruction and passive destruction or, more appropriately, self-implosion. A number of Indian analysts believe that Pakistan will collapse under its own contradictions, just like the former Soviet Union. On Pakistan’s alleged self-destruction, see Afsir Karim, “Radicalization of Pakistan and its Impact on India,” *ORF Issue Brief* Issue No. 11 (January 23, 2008), p. 6. Accessible via <http://www.observerindia.com>.
 25. C. Raja Mohan, “Fostering Strategic Stability and Promoting Regional Cooperation,” 1999, p. 34.
 26. I thank Dhruva Jaishankar for pointing this out.
 27. For more on the Chah Bahar post and the importance it has as India’s gateway into Central Asia, see Harsh V. Pant, “India and Iran: An “Axis” in the Making?” *Asian Survey* Vol. 44, No. 3 (May/June 2004), p. 377.
 28. For such an argument, see K. Subramanyam, “US needs to lean on Saudi Arabia to pressure Pakistan,” *South Asia Monitor*, June 16, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.southasiamonitor.org>.
 29. See comments made by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, and National Security Adviser, M. K. Narayanan, at the 1st IISS-Citi India Global Forum (transcripts of their comments are accessible via <http://www.iiss.org/conferences>); also, see comments made by C. Raja Mohan in Karl F. Inderfurth and Wendy Chamberlin, “Resolving old rivalries,” *International Herald Tribune*, July 17, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.iht.com>.
 30. For more on this, see Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization,” *International Studies Quarterly* No. 47 (2003), pp. 561–86.
 31. According to some reports, details regarding Pakistani army operations in Kargil were not even shared with the Chiefs of the Pakistan Air Force, Navy, and the rest of the army formations. See Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil conflict 1999,” *RUSI Journal* (April 2002), p. 26.
 32. Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p. 29.
 33. Ashley Tellis, et al., *Limited Conflicts*, p. 29 (emphasis in original).
 34. However it is, as yet, far from clear whether *all* the actors within Pakistan believe that the military option, in the form of either investing in militant groups or by supporting domestic terrorism within India or limited military operations, has been completely disowned. I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
 35. Interviews with high level defense officials, both current and former, in Delhi, May 2008; For a similar argument, see Rajesh Basrur, “Kargil, terrorism and India’s strategic shift,” *India Review* Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 51–53. For more on the Cold Start doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” *International Security* Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp. 158–90.
 36. Quoted in Alex Stolar, “To the Brink: Indian Decision-making and the 2001–2002 Standoff,” *The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 68* (Washington DC: February 2008), p. 31.
 37. See the next section for a detailed discussion on terrorist strikes and the impact on the peace process. For an analysis of the peace process and the composite dialogue, see

- Ashtosh Misra, "An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 61, Issue 4 (December 2007), pp. 506–28.
38. See comments made by the Indian National Security Adviser, Mr. N. K. Narayanan, following the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, "India says loud and clear: time to destroy ISI," *IBN Live*, July 12, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.ibnlive.com>.
 39. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) on February 04, 2008. Details accessible via <http://www.idsa.in/idsa-iss-agreement.htm>.
 40. See Rahimullah Yousafzai, "The Swat Peace Accord," *The News* May 24, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.thenews.com.pk>.
 41. Such an admission is notable because he is the first Army chief to say so. See "Pakistan's main threat comes from within: Musharraf," *Rediff News*, October 25, 2007. Accessible via <http://www.rediff.com/>.
 42. See Asif Ali Zardari, "Democracy within our Reach," *Washington Post*, September 4, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
 43. See comments made during interview with Bret Stephens, "The Most Difficult Job in the World," *Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2008. Accessible via <http://online.wsj.com>.
 44. Admittedly, the English language press in Pakistan is not a comprehensive source for capturing the Pakistani debate. Indeed the Urdu press has been much less supportive of Pakistan's participation on the war on terror. However, most serious Pakistani analysts, both civilian and former military officers, admit that the fight against extremism is Pakistan's own. See comments attributed to current ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha in Susanne Koelbl, "Terror is Our Enemy, Not India," *Der Spiegel*, January 6, 2009. Accessible via <http://www.spiegel.de>.
 45. As discussed in the next section, there is evidence that infiltration and, perhaps, support for militant groups operating in Indian Kashmir have declined. This suggests that Pakistan has scaled back its support for militant organizations. However, such claims can only be tentative and requires more evidence.
 46. For a news story alleging that Pakistani military and intelligence agencies are, indeed, playing a double game with the US, see Dexter Filkins, "Right at the Edge," *The New York Times Magazine* (September 5, 2008), accessible via <http://www.nytimes.com>. Also, see Seth Jones, "Insurgents and their support network," *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), pp. 36–66.
 47. For accounts of these firefights see Barbara Starr, "NATO: Insurgents try to pit Afghanistan against Pakistan," *CNN News*, July 11, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.cnn.com>.
 48. For the transcript of his speech delivered on April 13, 2006 at New Delhi see "PM's speech at the chief minister's meet on Naxalism," accessible via <http://pmindia.nic.in/speech>; for data showing the increase in Maoist violence see "Fatalities in Left Wing Extremism," South Asia Terrorism Portal Report. Accessible via <http://satp.org>.
 49. Ajai Sahni, "Left Wing extremism in India: Evolving strategies for containment," *CRPF Samachar*, October 2006, New Delhi.
 50. Sanjay Singh, "Left wing extremism on the rise in Eastern UP," *Indian Express*, June 16, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.expressindia.com>.
 51. See *Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs: 2007–2008*, Government of India, Annexure II, pp. 139–40.
 52. For a brief description of these attacks, see "Chronology: Some of the Recent terror attacks in India," *Outlook*, July 26, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.outlookindia.com>.
 53. See "Arunachal Pradesh is our territory: Chinese envoy," *Rediff News*, November 14, 2006. Accessible via <http://www.rediff.com>. Also, see Sujit Datta, "Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunachal," *Strategic Analysis* Vol. 32, Issue 4 (July 2008), pp. 549–81.
 54. See Sudha Ramachandran, "China toys with India's border," *Asia Times*, June 27, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.atimes.com>.
 55. Indian military officials increasingly refer to the "two-front problem," numerous interviews by the author in New Delhi in March 2008.

56. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India to bolster defenses along China border," *Defense News*, April 23, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.defensenews.com>.
57. See Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, "India's response to Chinese road building," *IDSIA Strategic Comments*, September 14, 2006. Accessible via <http://www.idsia.in/publications>.
58. See Sudha Ramachandran, "India goes to war in space," *Asia Times*, June 18, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.atimes.com>.
59. See Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China's 'String of pearls' in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications," *Strategic Analysis* Vol. 32, No.1 (January 2008), pp. 1–39.
60. See John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," *India Review* Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 1–38. Also, see Mohan Malik, "India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes," *PINR*, October 09, 2007. Accessible via <http://pinr.com>.
61. There is a large quantity of literature on the prospects and potential for India-Pakistan trade. See E. Sridharan, "Economic Cooperation and Security Spill-Overs: The Case of India and Pakistan," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., *Economic Confidence-Building and Regional Security*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 36, (Washington DC: October 2000); S. Akbar Zaidi, "Economic Confidence Building measures in South Asia: Trade as a Precursor to Peace with India," in Moonis Ahmar, ed., *The Challenge of Confidence Building in South Asia* (New Delhi: Haranand Publications, 2001); Nisha Taneja, India-Pakistan Trade, ICRIER Working Paper 182, ICRIER, New Delhi, June 2006; Zareen Naqvi and Philip Schuler, *The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan-India Trade*, (Islamabad: World Bank, 2006) and USAID, *South Asian Free Trade Area: Opportunities and Challenges* (Washington DC: USAID, 2006).
62. For a description of some of the business links that have developed since the start of the composite dialogue, see R. G. Gidadhbuli, "India-Pakistan Trade: Problems and Prospects," in P. M. Kamath, ed., *India-Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War* (New Delhi: Promilla Publishers, 2005), pp. 135–43.
63. See Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Trade policy widens scope for imports from India," *Dawn*, July 19, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.dawn.com>.
64. See Sridharan, "Economic Cooperation," p. 89.
65. See "South Asia Energy: Potential and Prospects for Regional Trade," *World Bank Report*, November 8, 2007. Accessible via <http://web.worldbank.org>. Also see Taneja, India-Pakistan Trade, p. 16.
66. Alyssa Ayres, "The Two Punjabs: A Cultural path to peace in South Asia?" *World Policy Journal* Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 63–68.
67. For the best description of this "proxy war" from the Indian perspective, see Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004* (London: Routledge, 2007).
68. This figure matches the data posted in Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) annual reports and has been corroborated by the Indian army's website honoring its fallen soldiers. Accessible via <http://www.mha.nic.in> and <http://indianarmy.nic.in/martyrs>.
69. This point, that Indian security forces have been disproportionately affected in comparison to the Pakistani military from the Kashmiri insurgency, is missed by most observers of the bilateral relationship. Of course, the two other elements that have become radicalized over the years are the people of Kashmir themselves and the Pakistani mujahideen. There is, thus, an "inverse radicalization" of Indian security forces and Pakistani mujahideen. Moreover, in light of this, it is not surprising that Indian security agencies see little difference between the Pakistan army and the jihadi elements.
70. Interviews by the author with serving military officers and journalists in New Delhi, May 2008. In the main, conversations suggest, that the permission to hold a press conference at Siachen base camp with the presence of international news media, came with bureaucratic and, perhaps, political approval. Moreover, the army chief at that time, Gen. J. J. Singh was later appointed governor of Arunachal Pradesh, which can hardly be considered a "punishment posting" for an allegedly recalcitrant General.
71. For the conventional interpretation of this incident, see Srinath Raghavan, "Siachen and Civil-Military Relations," *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 42, No. 35 (2007).

72. Prem Shankar Jha, "The Peace we missed," *Outlook India*, December 3, 2007.
73. This was a constant theme that emerged in interviews by the author with senior Pakistani diplomats in New Delhi and in Washington DC in May and August 2008, respectively.
74. For his remarks alleging an Indian role in fomenting the unrest in FATA, see Ejaz Haider, "Regional Security 101," *Daily Times*, August 2, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>.
75. See Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay and Julian Schofield, "Institutional causes of the India-Pakistan rivalry," in T. V. Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 225.
76. See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan," *Survival* Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 99.
77. See Ashley Tellis, "Engaging Pakistan- Getting the Balance Right," *Foreign Policy for the Next President*, Policy Brief No. 64 (September 2008), p. 2. This also offers a useful discussion on the consequences of imbalanced civil-military relations in Pakistan and its policy implications for the US and the region. Accessible via <http://carnegieendowment.org>.
78. See Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security* Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 58. For more on an allegedly duplicitous game played by Pakistani intelligence agencies, see Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008).
79. For a similar argument, see Rajesh Basrur, "From Conflict to Cooperation: The Politics of Change in India-Pakistan Relations," in P. M. Kamath, ed., *India-Pakistan Relations*, 2005, pp. 58-59.
80. President Musharraf initially made such claims in 2004 and then, more publicly, in 2006. See Sultan Shahin, "Resolving Kashmir with the Musharraf model," *Asia Times*, October 29, 2004. Accessible via <http://www.atimes.com>. Also, see "Musharraf suggests Pakistan willing to give up Kashmir claim," *International Herald Tribune*, December 5, 2006. Accessible via <http://www.iht.com>.
81. For a journalistic account of these talks, see Steve Coll, "The Back Channel," *The New Yorker* Vol. 85, No. 3 (March 2, 2009), pp. 38-51.
82. Praveen Swami, "Jihad loses its pull in Kashmir," *Asia Times*, April 10, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.atimes.com>.
83. Interview with senior Pakistani diplomat, New Delhi, May 2008. Also, see Prem Shankar Jha, "The Peace we missed," *Outlook India*, December 3, 2007; C. Raja Mohan, "Another Spring in the Valley," *Indian Express*, April 25, 2008; and Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir-Missed chances for Peace," *BBC News*, August 22, 2008. Accessible via <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
84. See "No Change in Kashmir policy, says Qureshi," *Daily Times*, August 23, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>.
85. Recent statements suggest that the local police are being strengthened while the paramilitary is to be sidelined, see M. Saleem Pandit, "Chidambaram wants J&K to do its own policing," *Times of India*, June 12, 2009. Accessible via <http://www.timesofindia.com>.
86. See Mir Ehsan, "Pak troops violate ceasefire, exchange fire on LoC," *Indian Express*, March 21, 2009 and Randeep Ramesh, "South Asia: Gunbattle shatters Kashmir ceasefire," *The Guardian*, July 30, 2008.
87. See "FATA militants commit to fight in Afghanistan," *Daily Times*, July 15, 2008. Accessible via <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>.
88. See Carlotta Gall and Eric Schmitt, "Taliban Breached NATO Base in Deadly Clash," *New York Times*, July 15, 2008.
89. See Michael Krepon, "The Meaning of the Mumbai Blasts," *Yale Global*, August 7, 2006. Accessible via <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu>; and "Pakistan peace process 'paused,'" *BBC News*, December 16, 2008. Accessible via <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
90. See Pradeep Thakur and Vishwa Mohan, "Indian Mujahideen is just hardline version of SIMI," *Times of India*, August 17, 2008. Accessible via <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

- 91 See comments attributed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Iftikhar Gilani, "Pakistan must punish Mumbai plotters for better ties: Manmohan," *Daily Times*, March 25, 2009. Accessible via <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>.
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117. See Amitabh Mattoo, "India-Pakistan Relations: Towards a Grand Reconciliation," in Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak, and Happymon Jacob, eds., *India and Pakistan: Pathways Ahead* (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2007), p. 2 (emphasis in the original).
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